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ABSTRACT 
  
 As initially formulated in the seminal analysis of Lazear and Rosen (1981), an important 
perspective for understanding the role of promotions in firms is the tournament perspective.  
That is, a promotion and, in particular, the wage increase associated with a promotion is a prize 
that serves as an incentive for workers to exert effort and take other actions beneficial to the firm 
such as the accumulation of human capital.  In this paper I consider whether the best way to 
model promotion tournaments is by having firms commit to prizes ex ante as in Lazear and 
Rosen’s initial formulation, or whether promotion prizes should be modeled as arising from the 







 One of the key insights in the personnel economics and organizational economics 
literatures is the notion of a promotion tournament.  That is, as initially put forth in Lazear and 
Rosen’s (1981) seminal analysis, promotions at firms and, in particular, the wage increases 
associated with promotions should be thought of as prizes that increase effort and result in other 
beneficial outcomes such as the accumulation of human capital.  In this paper I consider how 
promotion tournaments should be modeled.  Specifically, should they be modeled as prize 
structures committed to by the firm ex ante as in Lazear and Rosen’s initial formulation, or 
should they be modeled as arising from the signaling role of promotions and the subsequent 
competition between firms for promoted workers? 
 Most of the papers in the tournament literature follow Lazear and Rosen’s (1981) 
analysis where tournaments arise because firms commit to future levels of compensation.1  In 
their basic analysis there is a single firm that hires two identical workers where each worker’s 
output depends on a stochastic term and the effort level chosen by the worker.  In order to 
increase effort levels the firm commits to a high wage or prize for the worker who produces the 
higher output and a low wage for the worker who produces the lower output.  Further, Lazear 
and Rosen show that by appropriately choosing the spread, i.e., the difference between the high 
and low wages, the firm can induce efficient effort levels.  In this approach the worker who 
produces more and earns the higher subsequent wage is thought of as being promoted where the 
spread represents the wage increase due to the promotion. 
 This analysis has been extended in various ways.  For example, as will be discussed in 
more detail later, Rosen (1986) extends the analysis by considering multi-round tournaments.  In 
each stage of that analysis workers compete in pairs, where the winners in each stage proceed to 
compete in the following stage until only a single winner remains.  The main result in that 
analysis is that the tournament prize structure is convex in the sense that the wage increase 
                                                     
1 Surveys that discuss the tournament literature include Lazear (1999), Gibbons and Waldman (1999a), Prendergast 
(1999), Lazear and Oyer (2010), and Waldman (2010). 
2 
associated with winning the last round of the tournament is larger than the increases associated 
with winning earlier rounds.  Other important extensions include Lazear’s (1989) model of 
sabotage and wage compression, and Meyer (1992) that considers a multi-stage tournament 
model and shows the possibility of biased promotion contests. 
 All of the extensions mentioned above follow the Lazear and Rosen approach of 
assuming that the prize structure arises from commitment.  That is, a firm setting up a promotion 
tournament commits to future compensation levels and also rules concerning who will be 
promoted.  But there is a small set of papers that take a different approach.  Gibbs (1995), 
Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001), Ghosh and Waldman (2010), and Zabojnik (2010) all build on 
Waldman (1984a) and investigate what I will call market-based tournaments.  In a market-based 
tournament it is assumed that firms do not have the ability to commit to future compensation 
levels or rules concerning who to promote.  Rather, tournaments arise because the signal 
associated with a promotion results in potential employers willing to bid more for promoted 
workers which, in turn, causes the current employer to pay large wage increases upon promotion 
in order to reduce the probability of turnover.2 
 Market-based tournaments are similar to a Lazear and Rosen type tournament, hereafter 
classic tournament, in many ways, but there are also important differences.  Just as in a classic 
tournament, the wage increase associated with promotion can result in higher worker effort or 
other actions beneficial to the firm such as the accumulation of human capital.  Also, as will be 
discussed in more detail later, some of the predictions of classic tournaments are also predictions 
of market-based tournaments.  For example, in a classic tournament effort is higher when the 
wage spread or prize is higher, while market-based tournament theory makes the same 
prediction.  But the two theories differ in important ways including how the size of the prize is 
determined.  In a classic tournament the firm commits to the prize early on and the magnitude of 
                                                     
2 In addition to Waldman (1984a), other theoretical papers that have investigated the signaling role of promotions 
include MacLeod and Malcomson (1988), Ricart i Costa (1988), Waldman (1990), Bernhardt (1995), Owan (2004), 
and Golan (2005). 
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the prize is chosen with the knowledge that a higher prize induces more effort.  In contrast, in a 
market-based tournament the effect of the prize on effort is ignored by the firm at the time the 
prize is chosen (because those effort choices are in the past) and rather the size of the prize is 
determined by expected wage offers of other firms and current turnover considerations. 
 In this paper I compare and contrast classic tournament theory with market-based 
tournament theory with a specific focus on which approach better matches the relevant empirical 
evidence.  My conclusion is that most of the evidence does not allow us to distinguish between 
the theories, one important finding in the literature is more easily explained by classic 
tournament theory, while another finding is better explained by market-based tournaments.  So, 
as I discuss in detail towards the end of the paper, maybe the correct approach is a hybrid 
approach that combines the two theories. 
 The outline for the paper is as follows.  Section II presents a basic classic tournament 
model taken from Lazear and Rosen (1981), derives results from this model that will be useful 
for the later discussion of the empirical evidence, and also discusses relevant extensions and 
related analyses.  Section III presents a market-based tournament model from Ghosh and 
Waldman (2010) and then presents extensions and related analyses that are useful for 
considering the empirical evidence.  Section IV first discusses the literature that tests predictions 
of the classic tournament approach, then discusses the empirical literature on asymmetric 
learning in labor markets, and ends with an overview and synthesis.  Section V presents 
concluding remarks.  
 
II. THE CLASSIC TOURNAMENT APPROACH 
 In the first subsection I present the basic model in Lazear and Rosen (1981) and derive 
and discuss some standard results from that model.  In the second subsection I discuss a few 
extensions of the classic tournament approach and related analyses, where the main paper 
emphasized is Rosen (1986) because that paper provides a prediction that is useful for 
distinguishing between classic and market-based tournaments. 
4 
A) The Basic Lazear and Rosen (1981) Model 
 In the basic Lazear and Rosen (1981) model there are two identical workers and a single 
firm, where the output of worker i is given by yi=ei+εi.  In this equation ei is worker i’s effort 
level and εi is the realization of a stochastic term drawn from the density function f(ε) which has  
zero mean.  There is a disutility for effort given by c(ei), c´>0 and c´´>0, and each worker has a 
reservation utility level U0.  Further, in their most basic model everyone is risk neutral.   
 The compensation rule used by the firm is quite simple.  There are two wages, wH and 
wL, where the worker who produces the higher output is paid wH and the worker who produces 
the lower output is paid wL.  One can interpret the worker producing the higher output as 
receiving a promotion and the difference in wages, wH-wL, sometimes referred to as the spread, 
is the prize associated with being promoted.  Note that one feature of this compensation scheme 
is that the firm does not need to observe the exact output levels produced, but instead only needs 
to observe which worker produces more. 
 Each worker chooses the effort level that maximizes the worker’s utility which means 
that the effort level chosen equates the marginal benefit of additional effort with its marginal 
cost.  Let ej* denote the equilibrium effort level of worker j.  Then worker i’s effort choice 
satisfies equation (1). 
(1)                                 (wH-wL)(∂Prob{yi(ei)>yj(ej*)}/∂ei)=c´(ei), 
where Prob{yi(ei)>yj(ej*)} is the probability i’s output exceeds j’s output given i chooses effort 
level ei and j chooses ej*.  Focusing on symmetric Nash equilibria, (1) reduces to (2).                                           
      (2)                                              (wH-wL) ∫
jε
f(εj)2dεj=c´(ej*)  
Equation (2) tells us that an increase in the spread causes the equilibrium effort choice to rise 
since c´(ej*) must rise and c´´>0. 
 Given risk neutrality, the firm chooses the spread that yields first-best effort.  That is, 
given the production function is yi=ei+εi, the spread is chosen so that c´(ej*)=1.  If, on the other 
hand, the workers were risk averse, then the firm would reduce the spread which would provide 
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partial insurance to the workers and the result would be an equilibrium effort level below the 
first best. 
 In addition to analyzing how a promotion tournament works, Lazear and Rosen compare 
the optimal tournament compensation scheme with the optimal piece-rate or linear contract.  
They find that in the case of risk neutrality the two compensation schemes are equally efficient 
since they both result in first-best behavior.  In the case of risk aversion they show that in some 
cases tournaments are superior while in others linear contracts are more efficient.  Mookherjee 
(1984), however, allows for non-linear contracts and shows that the optimal non-linear contract 
is typically superior to the optimal tournament.3  Although, consistent with an earlier point, one 
reason tournaments may be used despite Mookherjee’s result is that tournaments require only 
ordinal information, while Malcomson (1984) makes the related point that tournaments may be 
used when output is not verifiable because tournaments are feasible in such a setting while 
standard output-based contracts are not. 
 One final point concerning the classic tournament model concerns the issue of 
commitment.  If we think of the classic tournament model as a model of promotions, then it 
makes most sense to envision the model as a reduced form version of the following two-period 
model.  In period 1 the workers choose effort levels, outputs are produced, and the workers are 
paid some fixed wage independent of output.  In period 2 workers again choose effort levels, 
produce outputs, and are paid wages.  Lazear and Rosen’s analysis can be thought of as 
investigating the ability of the firm to induce high period-1 effort levels by paying a higher 
period-2 wage to the period-1 worker who produces the higher output.  
 But when thought of in this way clearly Lazear and Rosen are assuming that the firm can 
commit and that there are no competitive constraints on what the firm can commit to.  For 
example, in the above analysis the firm chooses wH and wL taking into account how these wage 
rates affect worker effort choices.  But in the two-period version of the model these are first-
                                                     
3 Green and Stokey (1983) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) also compare tournaments and contracts but are subject 
to the same criticism that they do not focus on optimal contracts. 
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period effort choices and the wages are determined in the second period.  In the absence of 
commitment, in the two-period model the firm would not take into account how second-period 
wages affect first-period effort choices since those choices have already been determined by the 
time those wages are chosen.  Also, there could be constraints on what the firm can commit to 
because in period 2 workers would have the option of leaving and taking a wage offered by an 
alternative employer.  So, if we want to think of the classic tournament model as a model of 
promotions, we are implicitly assuming that when workers are young the firm commits to future 
wage levels and the wage offers of alternative employers are sufficiently low that they do not 
serve as constraints.4  I will come back to this point at the end of the paper.      
 
B) Extensions and Related Analyses 
 There are a number of extensions of Lazear and Rosen’s (1981) basic tournament model 
and also some important related analyses.  A simple but important extension is to allow n 
workers in the tournament rather than two.5  If we continue to restrict the analysis to symmetric 
outcomes, then holding the prize fixed means that in equilibrium the probability a randomly 
chosen worker wins the prize is 1/n rather than 1/2 and more importantly the marginal benefit to 
additional effort falls so equilibrium effort also falls.  This leads to one of the testable predictions 
of the classic tournament approach which is that the prize is an increasing function of the number 
of workers competing for the prize.  That is, since if the prize is held fixed effort falls as the 
number of competing workers increases, an optimal tournament which achieves the efficient 
effort level has a prize that increases with the number of competitors.  
                                                     
4 See Waldman (2003) for a more extensive discussion of the classic tournament approach and commitment – this 
paper is described briefly in the next section.  Also, rather than assuming commitment, one can think of the classic 
tournament approach as a reduced form of a repeated-game setting where wH and wL are determined by reputation 
considerations, although Zabojnik (2010) shows that in a competitive setting the full commitment outcome cannot 
be achieved through repeated interaction no matter how large is the discount factor. 
5 See Green and Stokey (1983) and O’Keeffe, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser (1984) for analyses along this line and 
Prendergast (1999) for a discussion. 
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 Another basic extension is to consider asymmetric tournaments, i.e., the workers are 
heterogeneous in various ways.  Lazear and Rosen (1981) present a number of analyses of 
asymmetric tournaments (see also O’Keeffe, Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1984)), where the specific 
analysis I want to focus on is where the players have heterogenous abilities and these abilities 
are publicly observable.6  In such a case having a standard tournament with a single prize does 
not result in efficient effort levels.  Rather, Lazear and Rosen show that efficiency is achieved by 
biasing or handicapping the tournament so that either the lower ability player wins as long as this 
worker’s output is not too much below the higher ability worker’s output or the prize is larger if 
the lower ability worker wins. 
 Another important extension concerns the issue of sabotage which has been explored in a 
number of papers including Lazear (1989), Garvey and Swan (1992), and Drago and Garvey 
(1998).  Lazear considers a setting where workers can exert effort in both productive and 
sabotage activities, where sabotage reduces the outputs of other workers.  The return to exerting 
effort in sabotage is that, since the tournament prize goes to the worker with the highest output, 
by exerting effort in sabotage a worker increases the probability he or she will win the prize.  
Lazear shows that in such a setting higher prizes result in more sabotage.  Further, as a result of 
this relationship the firm reduces the prize below the level it would choose if the possibility for 
sabotage was not present, and this argument in turn serves as a potential explanation for wage 
compression which is a phenomenon frequently described by personnel managers.  Drago and 
Garvey (1998) extend the theory and show that in addition to the size of the prize being 
positively related to sabotage, it is also negatively related to the amount of effort workers exert 
in helping co-workers.  Drago and Garvey also conduct an empirical analysis which I discuss 
below.  
                                                     
6 In this particular analysis Lazear and Rosen assume that the two workers have different marginal costs of effort, 
but this can be interpreted as different abilities since a higher ability worker should have a lower cost of choosing an 
effort level consistent with any specific expected output. 
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 From our perspective the most important extension is Rosen’s (1986) analysis of multi-
stage tournaments since this analysis provides one of the predictions that will help us distinguish 
between the two approaches for modeling real-world tournaments.  Rosen considers a single-
elimination tournament with a single winner at the end of the tournament.  In round 1 workers 
compete in pairs, where the low output worker in each pair does not compete again while the 
high output worker goes on to round 2 and is paired with another round-1 winner.  Subsequent 
rounds work similarly until only a single winner remains at which point wages are paid, where 
the wage a worker receives depends on the number of rounds he or she wins.  Rosen assumes 
workers are identical and risk neutral.  Also, rather than trying to solve for the optimal prize 
structure, Rosen characterizes the prize structure that results in workers exerting the same 
constant effort level from round to round. 
 Rosen’s main result is that the monetary prize for winning a round is higher in the last 
round than in previous rounds.  To see the logic here suppose there are 2n workers which means 
the tournament has n rounds.  Denote wk as the wage received by a worker who wins k rounds, 
c* as the disutility from the constant effort level, and e* as this effort level.  In each round except 
the last the prize for winning the round has two components – the direct prize for winning that 
round and the prize for remaining in the tournament and having a positive probability of winning 
further rounds.  For example, consider a worker who wins the first n-2 rounds.  The prize for 
winning round n-1 is the direct monetary prize for winning round n-1 which equals wn-1-wn-2 
plus the expected prize for participating in subsequent rounds which equals (1/2)(wn-wn-1)-c*. 
 We can now derive Rosen’s main result.  In equilibrium in round n-1 the marginal benefit 
for the worker increasing effort should equal the marginal cost.  The marginal benefit is the 
increase in the probability of winning multiplied by the sum of the direct monetary payoff for 
winning round n-1 which equals wn-1-wn-2 plus the expected prize for participating in subsequent 
rounds which equals (1/2)(wn-wn-1)-c*, while the marginal cost is c´(e*).  As above, call the sum 
of the direct monetary payoff for winning in round k plus the expected return for participating in 
subsequent rounds the prize for winning in round k.   
9 
 To keep effort the same across rounds means the prize should be the same across rounds.  
This means the prize in round n-1 should equal the prize in round n.  This yields equation (3). 
(3)                                        wn-1-wn-2+(1/2)(wn-wn-1)-c*=wn-wn-1 
Rearranging equation (3) yields wn-wn-1=2(wn-1-wn-2-c*).  We also know that the prize in round 
n-2 should equal the prize in round n-1.  This yields equation (4). 
(4)         wn-2-wn-3+(1/2)(wn-1-wn-2)-c*+(1/4)(wn-wn-1)-(1/2)c*=wn-1-wn-2+(1/2)(wn-wn-1)-c*  
Given wn-wn-1=2(wn-1-wn-2-c*), equation (4) yields wn-2-wn-3=wn-1-wn-2.  In turn, repeating this 
argument for earlier rounds yields the final conclusion that w1-w0=w2-w1=…=wn-1-wn-2= 
(1/2)(wn-wn-1)+c*.7 
 One drawback of this result is that it does not fully capture the empirical evidence.  That 
is, as will be discussed in more detail later, the empirical evidence indicates that promotion 
prizes grow as workers move up the job ladder but the finding is not confined to the very last 
step as in the theoretical analysis above.  But there are a number of ways of extending the 
analysis that should result in the possibility that the growth in promotion prizes is not confined to 
the last step.  For example, along the lines of a discussion in Rosen (1986), one could introduce a 
richer and more realistic production function and solve for optimal effort levels rather than 
assume effort is constant across rounds.  Suppose the return to extra ability or effort is increasing 
with the hierarchical level as in Rosen (1982) or Waldman (1984b).  Then it is likely that optimal 
effort will increase monotonically with hierarchical rank, and my conjecture is that this would 
result in the prize for winning a round also increasing monotonically.  Another possibility is to 
allow the number of workers competing in each round to vary.  My conjecture is that, if the 
                                                     
7  Prendergast (1999) argues that in one interpretation of Rosen’s model the main result is not due to winning the 
last round of the tournament being associated with no probability of winning subsequent rounds (see his footnote 
76).  The differerence between my interpretation above and this discussion of Prendergast is that we employ 
different interpretations of Rosen’s original analysis.  I interpret Rosen’s analysis in terms of a real-world single-
elimination tournament where a participant receives the same monetary prize for winning k rounds and then 
forfeiting in round k+1 as he or she would receive for winning k rounds and then losing in round k+1.  In 
Prendergast’s footnote discussion he interprets Rosen’s analysis as a sequence of contests, where a player who 
forfeits in round k+1 receives a higher monetary prize than a player who loses in round k+1.  Both interpretations 
are consistent with Rosen’s formal analysis since forfeiting is an off-the-equilibrium path event in Rosen’s model 
and Rosen never specifies what the monetary prize would be for a participant who forfeits.  I would like to thank 
Canice for e-mail exchanges which helped me better understand his argument.   
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number of workers competing rose with hierarchical rank, this change would also result in 
promotion prizes increasing monotonically with job level. 
 Another model of multi-round tournaments is put forth in Meyer (1992).  In that analysis 
two identical risk-averse workers compete against each other sequentially over two rounds, 
where the firm can commit at the beginning of the game to have a bias or handicap in the second 
round.  Meyer shows that it is optimal for the firm to conduct the second round so that it is 
biased in favor of the first-round winner, i.e., the first-round winner also wins the second round 
unless the other worker’s second-period output exceeds the first-round winner’s output by at 
least some amount Δ.  The rationale for the result is that, as long as the bias is small, the 
reduction in second-period effort is second order while the increase in first-period effort is first 
order.  This result provides a potential explanation for fast tracks, i.e., a setting where a worker 
who earns a first promotion quickly is also more likely to earn a second promotion quickly.8 
 Chan (1996) and Waldman (2003) extend the classic tournament model in a different 
direction (see also Tsoulouhas, Knoeber, and Agrawal (2007)).  Both papers consider classic 
tournament models where firms have to decide whether to staff a managerial position by 
promoting from within or hiring an outsider.  And using somewhat different theoretical 
arguments, both papers show that in a classic tournament setting firms have an incentive to favor 
insiders over outsiders in this decision.  For example, Waldman (2003) builds on the discussion 
concerning commitment mentioned earlier and shows that favoring insiders in promotion 
decisions can be a way to reduce or avoid time inconsistency (this analysis is also related to an 
earlier analysis in Malcomson (1984)).   
 Waldman (2003) starts with the observation that an increase in the probability that an  
entry-level worker receives a future promotion prize translates into a decrease in the wage a firm 
must pay to attract entry-level workers.  This, in turn, creates a time-inconsistency problem.  
                                                     
8 Meyer (1991) is another multi-round tournament model in which the second round is biased in favor of the first-
round winner.  In this paper output is affected by a stochastic element so the second-round bias arises because being 
the first-round winner, even after taking into account second-period outputs, adds valuable information concerning 
which worker has higher innate ability. 
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From the standpoint of profits starting at the date entry-level workers are hired it is optimal for 
the firm to limit hiring from the outside for promotion positions because doing so lowers the 
entry-level wage and thus increases profits.  However, at the time promotion decisions are 
actually made, those entry-level wages have already been paid and from the standpoint of current 
profits there is no reason to limit the hiring of outsiders for promotion positions.  The result is 
that in the absence of commitment the firm hires too many outsiders for promotion positions and 
this lowers overall profitability.  The conclusion is that to reduce or avoid this time-
inconsistency problem and increase overall profitability the firm creates internal bureaucratic 
rules that make it difficult to hire outsiders for high level managerial positions.    
 The final related analysis I will discuss is Prendergast (1993).  Prendergast considers a 
model of promotions that does not have a tournament structure.  In Prendergast’s analysis the 
problem the firm faces is to provide incentives to workers to invest in firm-specific human 
capital.  He shows that, if higher level jobs place higher values on human capital than lower level 
jobs, then the firm can solve its human-capital investment problem by committing to high wages 
for the higher level jobs, i.e., promotion prizes.  The logic is that the promotion prize serves as 
an incentive for workers to invest in firm-specific human capital because investing increases the 
probability of promotion and thus increases the probability the worker receives the promotion 
prize.9  Prendergast’s model is not formally a tournament model since there is only a single 
worker in his model.  But it would be easy to incorporate his idea into a two-period classic 
tournament model and show that tournaments can be used to provide incentives for firm-specific 
human-capital investments as well as incentives for effort. 
 
III. MARKET-BASED TOURNAMENTS 
 A few papers have explored market-based tournaments.  In the first and second  
                                                     
9 Prendergast’s analysis is closely related to Kahn and Huberman’s (1988) classic analysis of up-or-out contracts.  
One can think of the Kahn and Huberman analysis as showing that, if a firm has only a single job so Prendergast’s 
mechanism for supporting investments in firm-specific human capital is not available, then an alternative is for 
firms to employ up-or-out rules.  
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subsections I present and analyze the model analyzed in Ghosh and Waldman (2010) because 
like Lazear and Rosen (1981) it focuses on a setting where promotion prizes serve as incentives 
for worker effort.  In the last subsection I describe related analyses and extensions, where I focus 
on extensions that are helpful for addressing findings in the empirical literature. 
 
A) The Market-Based Tournament Model of Ghosh and Waldman (2010) 
 Ghosh and Waldman consider a two-period model with free entry, identical firms, and  
labor as the only input.  Workers in period 1 are denoted as young while in period 2 they are 
denoted as old.10  At the beginning of period 1 all firms and workers know that each worker’s 
innate ability equals θH with probability p and θL with probability (1-p), where θH>θL>0 and 
Θ=pθH+(1-p)θL.  It is also useful to define effective ability where worker i’s effective ability in 
period t is denoted ηit.  Let θi be the innate ability of worker i.  Then ηi1=θi and ηi2=kθi, k>1, 
where k captures general human capital the worker acquires with labor-market experience. 
 Each firm consists of two jobs, denoted 1 and 2.  If worker i is assigned to job j in period 
1, then output is given by  
      (5)                                               yij1=[dj+cj(ηi1+ei1+εi1)],   
while if the same worker is assigned to job j in period 2 then output is given by  
      (6)                                           yij2=(1+s)[dj+cj(ηi2+ei2+εi2)]. 
In (5) and (6) eit is worker i’s effort choice in period t, εit is the realization of a noise term drawn 
from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance σε2, and s=S, S≥0, if in period 2 worker i 
remains with the first-period employer and s=0 if the worker switches employers.  That is, S 
captures the accumulation of firm-specific human capital.  A worker can choose any effort level 
in the interval [0,eH], where disutility from effort is given by g(eit), g(0)=0, g´(0)=0, g´(e) and 
g´´(e)>0 for all e>0. 
                                                     
10 Along the lines of the earlier discussion of Prendergast (1993), one could argue that Ghosh and Waldman (2010) 
is not a tournament model because there is no requirement that only a single worker or some fixed number of 
workers are promoted.  But later I discuss how slot constraints could be added to the model in which case this 
condition would be satisfied. 
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 A worker’s output in each period is privately observed by the current employer, while the 
period-2 job assignment offered to a worker by the period-1 employer is public information so 
that as in Waldman (1984a) a promotion serves as a signal of ability.  Also, a worker’s effort 
choice each period is privately known by the worker.  Note, because a worker’s employer in 
period 1 observes the period-1 output, the firm has an updated belief at the beginning of period 2 
concerning the worker’s effective ability.  Given that, as is discussed below, all workers in 
period 1 are assigned to job 1, let η2e(yi11) denote this updated belief concerning worker i’s 
period-2 expected effective ability as a function of the worker’s period-1 output.    
 Due to the last-period problem, in period 2 each worker chooses an effort level equal to 
zero.  Let η´ be the value for effective ability that satisfies equation (7). 
      (7)                                                   d1+c1η´=d2+c2η´  
It is assumed that c2>c1>0 and d2<d1 so that, as in Rosen (1982) and Waldman (1984b), output 
increases more quickly with ability in job 2.  Given efforts in period 2 equal zero, we now have 
that it is efficient in period 2 to assign worker i to job 1(2) when η2e(yi11)<(>)η´.  Also, everyone 
in the model is risk neutral with a zero rate of discount and there is no worker moving costs or 
firm hiring or firing costs. 
 At the beginning of period 1 all firms simultaneously offer period-1 wages and each 
worker then chooses a period-1 employer.  After that each worker i chooses a period-1 effort 
level, the value for εi1 is realized, and at the end of period 1 each worker i’s period-1 employer 
observes the worker’s period-1 output. 
 Period 2 starts with each worker’s period-1 employer offering the worker a job 
assignment or firing the worker, where this decision is publicly observed.  Then all firms offer 
period-2 wages to workers and each worker’s period-1 employer is allowed to make a 
counteroffer, where a firm does not make an initial offer or counteroffer to any worker it fired at 
the beginning of the period.  Each worker then chooses a firm where a worker stays with the 
period-1 employer if no other firm offered a higher wage.  After that each worker i chooses a 
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period-2 effort level, εi2 is realized, and at the end of the period the period-2 employer privately 
observes the period-2 output. 
 The analysis is restricted to parameterizations that satisfy d1+c1(Θ+eH)>d2+c2(Θ+eH) 
which means all workers are assigned to job 1 in period 1, while it is also assumed that 
kθL<η´<kθH which means it is efficient in period 2 to assign some workers to job 1 and some to 
job 2.  Further, the analysis focuses on Perfect Bayesian equilibria where beliefs concerning off-
the-equilibrium path actions are consistent with each such action being taken by the type with 
the smallest cost of choosing that action.  This assumption is similar to the proper equilibrium 
refinement first discussed in Myerson (1978).11 
 
B) Analysis 
 I will start with three basic features of equilibrium in this model.  First, it exhibits a 
winner’s curse result similar to that found in Milgrom and Oster (1987).  Second, promotions 
serve as signals like in Waldman (1984a).  Third, as is also shown in Waldman’s analysis, 
because of the signal fewer workers are promoted than is first-best efficient. 
 We know that promotions serve as signals because promotions are publicly observable, 
while ability levels, effort levels, and outputs are not.  Given this, consider how wage offers are 
determined.  Because there are counteroffers and beliefs are that off-the-equilibrium path actions 
are taken by the type with the smallest cost of choosing that action, in period 2 in equilibrium 
firms other than a worker’s period-1 employer are only willing to offer the worker a wage equal 
to the expected productivity at such a firm produced by the lowest expected ability worker with 
the same labor-market signal, i.e., same age and job assignment.  In turn, this is also what the 
period-1 employer pays in period 2 because this is all that is required to keep the worker (Ghosh 
                                                     
11 Ghosh and Waldman analyze this model comparing standard promotion practices, i.e., there are no restrictions 
concerning which job a worker is assigned to in period 2, and up-or-out contracts, i.e., a retained old worker cannot 
be assigned to job 1.  They also conduct this analysis both when effort is not a factor and when it is.  Here my focus 
is solely on standard promotion practices when effort is a factor. 
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and Waldman focus on the unique equilibrium with no turnover which is the only equilibrium if 
S is sufficiently large).  This is exactly the winner’s curse result of Milgrom and Oster (1987).12 
 So what happens in period 2 in equilibrium is that there is a critical value, call it η+, such 
that when η2e(yi11)≥η+ worker i is assigned to job 2, while when η2e(yi11)<η+ the worker is 
assigned to job 1.13  Further, given the winner’s curse result just described and that period-2 
effort levels equal zero, the period-2 wage for workers assigned to job 1 equals d1+c1kθL, while 
the period-2 wage for workers assigned to job 2 equals max{d1+c1η+,d2+c2η+}. 
 The next step is to consider the value η+.  η+ is the value such that a firm is indifferent 
between assigning an old worker it previously employed to job 1 or job 2.  That is, given period-
2 effort levels equal zero, η+ satisfies equation (8). 
      (8)             (1+S)[d2+c2η+]-max{d1+c1η+,d2+c2η+}=(1+S)[d1+c1η+]-[d1+c1kθL]  
One can show that in equilibrium not everyone is promoted, i.e., η+>kθL, which means 
max{d1+c1η+,d2+c2η+}>d1+c1kθL.  Since d1+c1η´=d2+c2η´ and c2>c1, equation (8) now yields 
η+>η´ (which in turn implies max{d1+c1η+,d2+c2η+}=d2+c2η+).  That is, fewer workers are 
promoted than is efficient.  The logic is that there is a higher wage a firm pays a promoted 
worker due to the signal and the higher wage offers of alternative employers.  As a result, a firm 
only promotes a worker in period 2 when the worker is significantly more productive in job 2 
than in job 1.14  
 Given these results, the full equilibrium is as follows.  In period 1 all workers are 
assigned to job 1 given the parameter restrictions.  Further, they are paid a wage above expected 
                                                     
12 In the Milgrom and Oster (1987) model this result holds for any Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.  But there is no 
firm-specific human capital in their analysis and it is the incorporation of firm-specific human capital which 
necessitates the added assumption involving beliefs concerning off-the-equilibrium path actions imposed by Ghosh 
and Waldman for this result to hold in their model.  
13 Ghosh and Waldman assume that a worker is promoted when the firm is indifferent between promoting and not 
promoting the worker which is why when η2e(yi11)=η+ the worker is promoted.  
14 Golan (2005) investigates a related model without effort choice but with counteroffers and shows that, in contrast 
to what is found in Waldman (1984a) and elsewhere, the promotion rule is efficient.  In Golan’s model, however, 
output in the low level job is independent of ability.  So one result of the Ghosh and Waldman analysis is to show 
that, even with counteroffers, the promotion rule will not be efficient if output in the low level job is positively 
related to worker ability. 
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productivity due to a zero-expected-profit condition and that in period 2, because of firm-specific 
human capital and asymmetric information, each firm earns rents on the workers it employed in 
period 1.  Also, workers choose a positive level of effort, denoted e1, that can be equal to, above, 
or below the efficient period-1 effort level.  Further, although Ghosh and Waldman do not show 
the result, it would be easy to derive results in this model consistent with the prediction from 
classic tournament theory that effort levels, in this case period-1 effort levels, increase with the 
size of the promotion prize.  
 In period 2, as indicated above, all workers remain at the period-1 employer and workers 
are promoted when η2e(yi11)≥η+, where η+>η´.  Further, the wage of workers not promoted equals 
d1+c1kθL, the wage of promoted workers equals d2+c2η+, and period-2 effort levels equal zero 
because of the last-period problem.  Note that, given η+>η´>kθL and equation (7), we have that 
d2+c2η+>d1+c1kθL, i.e., there is a strictly positive wage increase due to promotion. 
 The point I would like to emphasize is the mechanism generating positive effort levels in 
period 1.  The mechanism is similar to what drives positive effort levels in the classic promotion 
tournament model discussed in the previous section.  In both cases what is driving the effort 
choice is that added effort increases the probability of a promotion and, as just indicated, with 
that promotion comes a higher wage.  The difference between the approaches is the rationale for 
why a promotion increases the wage.  In the classic tournament approach a firm realizes that the 
prize associated with a promotion serves as an incentive for worker effort and, in response, 
commits to a prize that maximizes firm profitability taking into account how the size of the prize 
affects effort levels chosen.  In contrast, in the market-based tournament approach it is assumed 
that firms cannot commit when workers are young to wage rates when workers are old.  Instead, 
what drives the higher promotion wage is the positive signal concerning worker ability when a 
promotion occurs and the higher wage offers other firms offer promoted workers in response to 
the signal.  Further, since there is no direct relationship between this mechanism and efficient 
effort choice, depending on the parameterization, the period-1 effort choice can be equal to, 
above, or below the efficient effort level. 
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 Another way to view this result is as an asymmetric-learning version of Holmstrom’s 
(1999) classic analysis of effort choice and career concerns.  Holmstrom considers effort choice 
in a model with a single job and symmetric learning.  In that model output is publicly observable 
while at the beginning of a worker’s career the worker’s innate ability level is not known.  The 
result is that each worker provides high effort early in the career because this improves firms’ 
beliefs concerning the worker’s innate ability level and thus increases wages later in the career.  
The Ghosh and Waldman model is an asymmetric-learning version of this argument.  In their 
model outputs are not publicly observable but job assignments/promotions are.  The result is that 
each worker provides high effort early in the career to increase the probability of promotion 
because promotions improve other firms’ beliefs concerning the worker’s innate ability, which in 
turn increases the worker’s wage at the current employer. 
 Finally, one advantage of the market-based tournament approach over the classic 
tournament approach is that it provides an explanation for a puzzle first discussed in Baker, 
Jensen, and Murphy (1988).  That paper asks, why is it that promotions are used to provide 
incentives rather than have incentives solely provided through monetary-based awards such as 
bonuses and non-promotion related salary increases?  That is, since promotions are used to 
allocate workers across positions, having promotions also serve an incentive role will sometimes 
result in inefficiencies because the individual optimally assigned to the higher level job is not 
always the same individual as the one who should be rewarded from an incentives perspective.  
The market-based tournament approach is an explanation for this puzzle because in that 
argument promotions have an incentive role not because that is part of the optimal design, but 
rather because the signaling role of promotions means incentives are an inherent part of the 
promotion process. 
 
C) Extensions and Related Analyses 
 A closely related analysis to the one described above appears in Zabojnik and Bernhardt 
(2001).  The main difference is that, rather than focusing on promotion prizes serving as 
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incentives for effort, in the Zabojnik and Bernhardt analysis the promotion prizes serve as an 
incentive for worker investments in human capital.  Other than this difference the basic logic is 
quite similar.  A promotion serves as a signal that the worker has accumulated a high level of 
human capital so alternative employers are willing to bid more for a promoted worker (human 
capital in their model is partially general which is why alternative employers are willing to bid 
more when they see the promotion signal).  In turn, to stop promoted workers from being bid 
away a firm pairs promotions with large wage increases and these promotion prizes serve as an 
incentive for workers to invest in human capital.   
 One other difference between the Zabojnik and Bernhardt analysis and the Ghosh and 
Waldman analysis discussed above is that, like in Lazear and Rosen’s analysis, in Zabojnik and 
Bernhardt’s analysis a firm promotes only a single worker.  Although below I describe a variant 
of the Ghosh and Waldman analysis that has this feature.  Also, in addition to developing the 
basic theoretical argument, Zabojnik and Bernhardt show that it serves as a potential explanation 
both for the empirical finding that larger firms pay more even after controlling for labor quality 
and the finding of inter-industry wage differences.15  
 One extension of the Ghosh and Waldman (2010) analysis appears in Ekinci (2011).  In 
the Ghosh and Waldman analysis in each period each worker is paid a wage that is independent 
of output and incentives arise solely from signaling and the resulting increased wages associated 
with promotions.  The result, as discussed, is that effort levels in period 2 equal zero because 
there are no future promotion wage increases to serve as incentives for effort.  In Ekinci’s 
analysis in each period workers sign bonus contracts, i.e., each worker earns a base wage and a 
bonus where the bonus is paid only when output is high.  So in this analysis incentives arise both 
from promotions serving as signals and from bonuses.  This approach avoids the unrealistic last-
                                                     
15 Papers that find that larger firms or establishments pay higher wages include Lester (1967), Brown and Medoff 
(1989), and Davis and Haltiwanger (1996).  Papers concerning inter-industry wage differences include Dickens and 
Katz (1987), Krueger and Summers (1987,1988), and Murphy and Topel (1987). 
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period result of zero effort in Ghosh and Waldman’s analysis since bonuses serve as an incentive 
for effort even when there is no possibility of future promotion. 
 Ekinci first shows that this model can explain the standard finding in the empirical 
literature that bonuses are more frequent and larger at higher levels of the job ladder – this is 
found, for example, in the classic empirical study of internal labor markets found in Baker, 
Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a,b).  The logic is that at higher levels of the job ladder there are 
fewer future promotion opportunities and so bonuses become more important in providing 
incentives.  Ekinci then develops three testable implications concerning how bonuses should 
vary with worker and job characteristics and provides supporting evidence for the predictions 
using the Baker, Gibbs, and Homstrom data set.  
 A second extension involves incorporating slot constraints into the model.  By slot 
constraints I mean there is a single managerial or job-2 position at a firm in any period.  That is, 
assume as before that each firm consists of jobs 1 and 2, but now there is a single job 2 or 
managerial position that can be staffed or left vacant.  In considering slot constraints I will also 
make two other changes.  First, the number of young workers a firm employs in period 1 is 
publicly observed.  Second, as in Greenwald’s classic analysis of asymmetric learning in labor 
markets, there is a small probability a worker switches employers in period 2 for exogenous 
reasons which are independent of worker ability (such as being the trailing spouse) and the 
realization concerning whether or not this is the case occurs immediately after the period-1 
employer makes its wage counteroffer.  As is discussed further later, this assumption avoids or at 
least reduces the winner’s curse result concerning wages seen in the earlier subsection and this is 
important for finding the main result emphasized below.16 
 Introducing slot constraints into the model complicates the analysis significantly, so I 
will just provide a partial analysis here.  My focus will be on the size of the prize associated with 
promotion in the case where firm-specific human capital is substantial so there is no turnover 
                                                     
16 It is also assumed that if an old worker assigned to job 2 in period 2 leaves for exogenous reasons, the firm is not 
allowed to assign a different period-1 employee to the managerial position. 
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other than the turnover for exogenous reasons and the production function is such that a firm 
always wants to assign a worker to job 2 in period 2.17  As in the analysis of the previous 
subsection, an old worker’s wage in period 2 is determined by the wage offers of other firms.  
Given this, consider the wage paid to a worker who is promoted, i.e., assigned to job 2, from 
within.  Because there is turnover due to exogenous reasons and no other turnover due to high 
firm-specific human capital, the expected effective ability of a specific old worker initially 
assigned to job 2 in period 2 who then moves equals the expected effective ability of that same 
worker not conditioning on the fact the worker moved.  In other words, given how turnover 
works in this specification, there is no winner’s curse or negative selection associated with 
turnover that causes potential employers to bid below the average productivity of a promoted 
worker.  So the wage paid to a worker promoted from within equals the expected productivity of 
the worker at a different firm which itself is positively related to the worker’s expected effective 
ability.   
 As indicated, the focus is on the prize associated with promotion, i.e., the difference in 
period 2 between the wage paid to the worker assigned to job 2 and the wage paid to workers 
assigned to job 1, and specifically how this difference varies with the number of young workers 
hired by the firm in period 1.18  Let nj denote the number of young workers hired by firm j in 
period 1.  Consider the wage paid to the worker assigned to job 2 in period 2 by firm j.  The 
worker assigned to job 2 will be the worker among firm j’s period-1 workers with the highest 
period-1 output.  Further, as nj rises the expected effective ability of this worker rises since the 
firm is choosing the best worker from a larger pool, so the period-2 offers for this worker rise 
which in turn means the worker’s period-2 wage rises if the worker stays with the period-1 
                                                     
17 A specific parameter restriction that guarantees the first condition is (1+S)[d1+c1kθ]>d2+c2kθ for all θ, θL≤θ≤θH.  
The second condition is satisfied if one of the parameter restrictions of the previous subsection is relaxed and it is 
instead assumed that η´<kθL. 
18 If the analysis is restricted to symmetric equilibria and it is assumed that in period 1 a worker chooses randomly 
between firms making identical wage offers, then the number of workers hired by a firm  in period 1 will vary with 
the random choices of workers in period 1 concerning which offers to accept. 
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employer (it also rises if the worker leaves).  In particular, the wage rises by kc2 multiplied by 
the increase in expected effective ability. 
 Now consider the wage paid to old workers assigned to job 1 in period 2 by firm j.  We 
know that the expected effective ability averaged across all nj workers at the beginning of period 
2 must equal kΘ.  There are thus two factors determining how the average expected effective 
ability of old workers assigned to job 1 changes as nj rises.  First, that there is an increase in the 
expected effective ability of the worker assigned to job 2 suggests that the average expected 
effective ability of the workers assigned to job 1 should fall since the average expected effective 
ability across all nj workers is unchanged as nj rises.  Second, that the worker assigned to job 2 
becomes a smaller proportion of firm j’s workers, i.e., 1/nj falls, suggests that the average 
expected effective ability of workers assigned to job 1 should rise.  One can show that the second 
effect dominates, which means that the wage for old workers assigned to job 1 rises and it rises 
by kc1 multiplied by the increase in the expected effective ability of old workers assigned to job 
1.  So both the wage for the promoted worker and the wage for old workers not promoted rise 
with nj, but given c2>c1 it will frequently be the case that the wage for the promoted worker rises 
faster with nj than does the wage for old workers assigned to job 1.  That is, the model is capable 
of capturing the prediction that the size of the prize rises with the number of workers in the pool 
from which the worker is drawn.19    
Above I show a specific variant of the Ghosh and Waldman (2010) framework that can 
capture the prediction that the size of the prize associated with promotion is positively related to 
the size of the pool from which the promoted worker is drawn.  But in fact there are various 
specifications that can capture this since it follows from a basic intuition of market-based 
                                                     
19 To see this consider the following simple example.  Let θL=0, θH=1, p=1/2, and σε2=0 (assuming that σε2=0 means 
that there is full learning by the period-1 employer at the end of the first period).  Let ηj1e be the expected effective 
ability from the standpoint of a period-2 potential employer of workers firm j assigns to job 1 at the beginning of 
period 2, while ηj2e is the analogous probability for the worker assigned to job 2.  Simple calculation yields that if 
nj=2 then ηj1e=1/4 and ηj2e=3/4; if nj=3 then ηj1e=5/16 and ηj2e=7/8; and if nj=4 then ηj1e=17/48 and ηj2e=15/16.  That 
is, expected effective ability for the worker assigned to job 2 rises faster with nj than expected effective ability for 
the workers assigned to job 1.  So since c2>c1, the size of the promotion prize for this example rises monotonically 
as nj increases from 2 to 4 and, if c2>>c1, it can be shown that the promotion prize rises generally with nj.   
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tournament models.20  As above, consider a market-based tournament model with a single 
managerial position.  The size of the prize associated with being promoted into that position 
should be a positive function of the strength of the signal associated with the promotion.  Since 
being the winner in a tournament with a larger number of competitors should send a more 
positive signal concerning the ability of the winner, we have the prediction that the size of the 
pool should be positively related to the prize associated with promotion. 
 A final issue of interest is why I changed the specification in the extension to move away 
from the strong winner’s curse result found in Ghosh and Waldman’s (2010) analysis described 
in the previous subsection.  Given a specification with a strong winner’s curse, the size of the 
promotion prize is determined by the expected effective ability of a worker with the lowest 
possible period-1 output that can result in a promotion.  If the specification of the model with 
slot constraints was changed so that there was a strong winner’s curse, an increase in nj would 
increase the expected effective ability of a promoted worker but would not increase the expected 
effective ability of a worker with the lowest period-1 output that can result in a promotion.  So 
even though the model would still have slot constraints, if the specification was characterized by 
a strong winner’s curse, it would not predict a positive correlation between the size of the 
promotion prize and the size of the pool from which the promoted worker is drawn. 
  
IV. THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 In this section I discuss the empirical literature concerning promotions, tournaments, and 
asymmetric learning and what this literature tells us concerning the choice between the classic 
tournament approach and market-based tournaments.  I start with papers that test classic 
tournament theory, then discuss papers concerning asymmetric learning in labor markets, and 
end with an overview and synthesis. 
 
                                                     
20 For example, Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001) also find the result in their analysis. 
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A) Tests of the Classic Tournament Approach 
 A number of papers have focused on testable predictions of the classic tournament 
approach.  These papers typically focus on one or more of the following six predictions: i) 
promotions should be associated with large wage increases; ii) effort levels should be positively 
related to the prize or spread; iii) the size of the prize associated with a promotion should be 
positively related to the number of workers in the pool from which the promoted worker is 
drawn; iv) the wage structure should be convex; v) sabotaging co-workers should be positively 
related and helping co-workers negatively related to the prize or spread; and vi) insiders should 
be favored over outsiders in filling managerial positions which also has implications for 
subsequent promotions.21 
 The first prediction that promotions should be associated with large wage increases is in a 
sense not a prediction since that is the observation that initially motivated the theory.  But to be 
complete let me point out that numerous papers find that promotions are associated with large 
wage increases.  A very partial list of papers that find this result is Murphy (1985), Gerhart and 
Milkovich (1989), Lazear (1992), Main, O’Reilly, and Wade (1993), Baker, Gibbs, and 
Holmstrom (1994a,b), and McCue (1996).  Of course, this evidence is consistent with both 
classic tournament theory and market-based tournament theory.22 
 A number of papers investigate the second prediction which is that effort in a tournament 
increases with the size of the prize.  These include Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a,b) who 
study professional golf tournaments, Becker and Huselid (1992) who study auto racing, Audas, 
Barmby, and Treble (2004) who study promotions at a British financial firm, and DeVaro 
                                                     
21 DeVaro (2006a,b) tests an additional prediction of the classic tournament approach which is that the presence of 
factors that depress effort should induce an employer to increase the promotion prize.  Although no one has 
formally looked at whether this prediction holds in market-based tournament models, I do not believe this is a 
prediction of that approach.  DeVaro (2006a) finds evidence consistent with the prediction, while DeVaro (2006b) 
does not. 
22 Gibbons and Waldman (1999b,2006) provide an alternative explanation for this finding which is based on 
symmetric learning, human-capital accumulation, and job assignment.  But, as pointed out in those papers, given 
that approach does not incorporate incentives, it is unlikely to represent a full explanation of wage and promotion 
dynamics inside firms. 
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(2006a,b) who studies a cross section of establishments across four metropolitan areas (see also 
Knoeber and Thurman (1994) which tests a related prediction).  All these studies find evidence 
consistent with the prediction.  However, although the evidence is consistent with the classic 
tournament approach, the prediction itself is not particularly specific to the theory.  Basically, it 
is a test of utility maximization since, whatever mechanism is generating the prize, utility 
maximization predicts that effort should be positively related to the size of the prize.  For this 
reason, the prediction is also consistent with market-based tournaments as mentioned in 
Subsection III.B. 
 There are also a number of studies that focus on the third prediction which is that the size 
of the prize associated with a promotion should be positively related to the size of the pool from 
which the promoted worker is drawn.  This has been studied by O’Reilly, Main, and Crystal 
(1988), Main, O’Reilly, and Wade (1993), Eriksson (1999), and Bognanno (2001).  All but the 
first study find evidence consistent with the prediction.  But remember that in Section III.C it 
was shown that this prediction is also consistent with market-based tournament theory, i.e., 
because the size of the signal due to promotion should be larger when the promoted worker is 
drawn from a larger pool, the prize associated with promotion should also increase with the size 
of the pool.  Thus, this evidence also does not distinguish between classic and market-based 
tournament theory. 
 The prediction of a convex wage structure has been studied in Lambert, Larcker, and 
Weigelt (1993), Eriksson (1999), and Bognanno (2001) and all these papers find evidence 
consistent with the prediction.  Also, in their classic study of wage and promotion practices using 
personnel records, Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a,b) report results consistent with the firm 
employing a convex wage structure.  In contrast to the evidence for the first three predictions, I 
see this as evidence that favors the classic tournament approach.  Although there are no multi-
round market-based tournament models that investigate the issue, I do not see a convincing 
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reason why convex wage structures should be a robust prediction of the market-based 
tournament approach.23 
 The fifth prediction is that the size of promotion prizes should be positively related to 
sabotage activities and negatively related to the amount of help provided to co-workers.  Drago 
and Garvey (1998) claim to test the prediction concerning helping behavior using a unique data 
set of Australian employees that allows the authors to assign individuals to workgroups and 
measure helping efforts by individuals inside a work group.  They find evidence that they 
interpret as supporting the classic tournament approach but there is an important flaw with their 
empirical work as a test of classic tournament theory.  Specifically, they do not have data on 
promotions.  Rather, they measure the size of promotion prizes using the standard deviation 
within a work group of residuals from a wage equation.  But high residuals could be due, for 
example, to high-powered incentives in pay-for-performance contracts rather than promotion 
wage increases.  In other words, the Drago and Garvey study is not a valid test of classic 
tournament theory.24 
 The final prediction which is that insiders should be favored over outsiders in the 
promotion process has been tested in Chan (2006), Agrawal, Knoeber, and Tsoulouhas (2006), 
and Oyer (2007).  If insiders are favored over outsiders in filling managerial positions, then, 
focusing on workers at a firm at the same job level, those hired from the outside should be more 
productive.  Oyer (2007) tests this with data on academic economists and finds that outside of 
the top ten schools, after controlling for school and year of graduation, those hired from the 
outside are indeed more productive (based on journal publications) than those promoted from 
                                                     
23 For the market-based tournament approach to generate a convex wage structure the signal associated with a 
promotion would have to be larger for promotions higher up the job ladder.  This is certainly possible if the 
marginal return to ability rises much faster with hierarchical level at higher levels of the hierarchy than at lower 
levels (I would like to thank Hodaka Morita and Jan Zabojnik for both pointing this out to me) and/or if the 
underlying distribution of abilities has a long right-hand tail, but I do not see these possibilities as sufficiently likely 
to conclude that having a convex wage structure is a robust feature of the market-based tournament approach. 
24 Further, even if there was valid evidence consistent with this fifth prediction of classic tournament theory, it 
would not allow us to distinguish between the classic and market-based tournament approaches.  That is, the same 
logic that yields that the size of promotion prizes should be positively related to sabotage and negatively related to 
helping activities in classic tournament theory should predict the same relationships for the market-based 
tournament approach. 
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within.  Chan (2006) tests the related prediction that, if those at a level hired from the outside are 
more productive, then they should have a higher probability of subsequent promotions.  Using 
personnel data from a US financial services corporation, Chan finds evidence consistent with this 
prediction.  Finally, Agrawal, Knoeber, and Tsoulouhas consider promotions to CEO positions 
and also find evidence that supports the theory. 
 As with most of the other predictions discussed above, this evidence is consistent with 
market-based tournament theory since it can be explained by asymmetric learning which is at the 
heart of that theory.  That is, if firms know more about insiders than outsiders and are somewhat 
risk averse in their hiring decisions, then those at a job level hired from the outside will have 
higher expected ability which can explain both Oyer’s and Chan’s findings and related 
arguments can explain the findings in the Agrawal, Knoeber, and Tsoulouhas paper.25 
 
B) Empirical Tests of Asymmetric Learning 
 For the market-based tournament approach to have validity it must be the case that 
asymmetric learning in labor markets is important because otherwise promotions could not serve 
as signals.  In this subsection I discuss the empirical literature on asymmetric learning including 
a paper that specifically focuses on the promotion-as-signal hypothesis.   
 The classic paper testing for asymmetric learning in labor markets is the Gibbons and 
Katz (1991) study of adverse selection in labor-market turnover.  Building on Akerlof (1970), 
Greenwald (1979,1986) develops an adverse-selection model of labor-market turnover in which 
workers who move between firms are disproportionately drawn from the low end of the ability 
distribution.  Gibbons and Katz extend this analysis to a setting with both laid-off workers and 
                                                     
25 Oyer discusses the idea that his results can be explained by asymmetric learning.  Chan also discusses the 
possibility that asymmetric learning can explain his results but rejects the possibility based on an argument that 
asymmetric learning does not explain his finding that the effect of being an outsider on the rate of subsequent 
promotions is smaller at higher levels.  I do not find this argument persuasive both because it is unclear from what 
Chan reports that the difference between levels concerning the rate of subsequent promotions is statistically 
significant, and because the difference between levels that Chan finds could be explained by something as simple as 
the rate of subsequent promotions at higher levels being lower.  Agrawal, Knoeber, and Tsoulouhas do not consider 
the possibility that asymmetric learning can explain their findings. 
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those fired in a plant closing, where they show that laid-off workers should be lower ability 
because adverse selection applies to laid-off workers but not those fired in a plant closing.26  
They then derive three testable implications: i) predisplacement wages should be uncorellated 
with the type of termination; ii) postdisplacement wages should be lower for laid-off workers; 
and iii) unemployment duration after displacement should be higher for laid-off workers.  They 
also analyze data from the CPS and find evidence that supports all three predictions. 
 A number of follow-up studies have investigated the Gibbons and Katz predictions with 
mixed results concerning whether the original Gibbons and Katz findings are due to asymmetric 
learning.  Some studies such as Doiron (1995), Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), Grund (1999), 
and Hu and Taber (2011) find results consistent with the Gibbons and Katz interpretation of their 
findings.  For example, Acemoglu and Pischke extend the theoretical framework to show how 
asymmetric learning can lead firms to provide workers with general training and then show 
supporting evidence using German data.  More recently, Hu and Taber re-examine CPS data and 
find that the Gibbons and Katz predictions only hold for white males which they explain with an 
extension of the Gibbons and Katz theoretical framework that incorporates heterogeneous human 
capital. 
 But other studies such as Stevens (1997), Krashinsky (2002), and Song (2007) argue that 
the Gibbons and Katz results are explained by something other than asymmetric learning.  Using 
data from the PSID, Stevens shows that larger wage losses after termination in the case of layoffs 
can be explained by wage reductions for those terminated in a plant closing that occur prior to 
the actual termination.  Krashinsky argues that the Gibbons and Katz results arise because laid-
off workers are disproportionately from larger establishments which pay higher predisplacement 
wages, while Song makes a similar argument and also shows results consistent with recall bias 
being important. 
                                                     
26 To be more precise, in their argument Gibbons and Katz allow for both adverse selection and the possibility that a 
layoff serves as a signal like in the promotion-as-signal hypothesis. 
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 More recently, a number of studies including Schoenberg (2007), Kahn (2008), Zhang 
(2008), and Pinkston (2009) have developed other tests of asymmetric learning and those papers 
mostly find supporting evidence.  Specifically, Schoenberg finds evidence consistent with 
asymmetric learning being important for university graduates but not for high school graduates 
and dropouts,27 while Kahn, Zhang, and Pinkston explore a variety of tests and all find evidence 
consistent with asymmetric learning. 
 The last asymmetric-learning analysis I will discuss is DeVaro and Waldman (2011).  
This paper’s focus is the promotion-as-signal hypothesis, so it is the paper in the empirical 
literature on asymmetric learning most relevant for choosing between the classic and market-
based tournament approaches.  DeVaro and Waldman first extend the basic promotion-as-signal 
model by allowing workers to vary in terms of their education levels (see Bernhardt (1995) for a 
related analysis) and then use this model to derive three testable implications.  First, holding 
performance fixed, a worker’s probability of receiving a first promotion should increase with the 
worker’s education level.  Second, the wage increase due to a first promotion should be 
decreasing with the worker’s education level.  Third, the first two relationships should hold more 
strongly for first promotions than for subsequent promotions. 
 After developing these testable predictions, DeVaro and Waldman investigate the 
predictions using the data set first analyzed in Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a,b) 
mentioned earlier.  They find clear evidence for the promotion-as-signal hypothesis for workers 
with bachelors and masters degrees, while the evidence concerning high-school graduates and 
PhDs is mixed.  Specifically, the predictions that pertain to promotion probabilities hold for all 
education groups, while the predictions concerning wage increases only hold for bachelors and 
masters degree holders.  Note that it is possible that the reason the wage-growth predictions do 
                                                     
27 Schoenberg (2007) develops and tests two predictions concerning asymmetric learning.  The first is the basic 
prediction found initially in Greenwald (1979,1986) that workers who turnover should be disproportionately from 
the low end of the ability distribution.  She finds clear evidence for this prediction among university graduates.  The 
second is that the return to ability should be positively related to firm tenure and for this prediction she finds mixed 
evidence among university graduates.  This prediction follows from the specific theoretical model of asymmetric 
learning that she considers, but I do not believe it is a robust prediction of asymmetric-learning models.  So my 
interpretation is that Schoenberg’s findings are consistent with asymmetric learning for university graduates. 
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not hold for high-school graduates and PhDs is that these workers are in systematically different 
jobs and the controls DeVaro and Waldman use for job type are not sufficient to control for these 
differences.  Also, they consider various alternative explanations for their empirical findings 
such as symmetric learning, education provides higher level skills, and coarse performance 
measures and find that none of the alternatives can explain their empirical findings. 
 So overall the empirical evidence supports asymmetric learning in real-world labor 
markets and, in particular, there is evidence that specifically supports the promotion-as-signal 
hypothesis.  In terms of choosing between classic and market-based tournaments, this evidence 
is clearly consistent with market-based tournament theory.  As for the classic tournament 
approach, in general I do not see anything inconsistent with labor markets being characterized by 
both classic tournaments and asymmetric learning.  However, one of the results in DeVaro and 
Waldman (2011) does seem problematic for the classic tournament approach.  As just discussed, 
DeVaro and Waldman find that, holding performance fixed, the probability of receiving a first 
promotion rises with education.28  But remember Lazear and Rosen (1981) argue that in an 
asymmetric tournament the firm would like to bias the tournament in favor of lower ability 
workers.  This suggests that, holding performance fixed, the probability of promotion should 
decrease rather than increase with education.  So the DeVaro and Waldman result that for first 
promotions it increases with education is inconsistent with the classic tournament approach.29 
 
C) Overview and Synthesis 
 There is an extensive literature that tests predictions of the classic tournament approach 
and most of the findings in this literature are consistent with predictions of that approach.  
However, as discussed in Subsection IV.A, all but one of the predictions for which there is clear 
                                                     
28 Belzil and Bognanno (2010) find related results in an empirical study that employs an eight-year panel of 
promotion histories of a large number of American executives. 
29 Knoeber and Thurman (1994) find evidence consistent with the biasing hypothesis but their evidence does not 
concern promotion tournaments, so it is not as relevant for the topic of this paper as are the findings of DeVaro and 
Waldman (2011). 
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evidence are also consistent with the market-based tournament approach.  For example, it is not 
surpising that, even when promotion wage increases are determined by signaling rather than 
optimal design, promotions are associated with large wage increases and bigger prizes result in 
higher effort levels.  It is also the case that, since the signal associated with promotion should be 
larger when the promoted worker is drawn from a larger pool of workers, the market-based 
tournament approach is also consistent with the size of the promotion prize being positively 
related to the size of the pool. 
 The one empirical finding in this literature that seems inconsistent with market-based 
tournaments is that of a convex wage structure.  Rosen’s (1986) model suggests that classic 
tournaments with multiple rounds should have convex wage structures because the prize 
associated with early promotions include the possibility of many later promotions, while this is 
not the case when a promotion brings a worker close to the top of the job ladder.  So to preserve 
incentives near the top, it is necessary to have larger promotion prizes for promotions at the top 
of the job ladder (I also provided a discussion of extensions of Rosen’s initial model that should 
serve to strengthen the argument).  There is no clear cut reason why this would be a robust 
feature of the market-based tournament approach.  So the evidence in the literature consistent 
with convex wage structures points to the classic tournament approach. 
 The second relevant empirical literature is the literature that tests for asymmetric learning 
in labor markets.  Most of the papers in this literature find evidence that supports asymmetric 
learning being important which is consistent with the market-based tournament approach, 
although as I stated earlier, I do not think there is any inconsistency in general between 
asymmetric learning and the classic tournament approach.  But DeVaro and Waldman (2011) 
find evidence consistent with the promotion-as-signal hypothesis holding for at least some 
education groups which favors the market-based approach at least for these groups.  Further, of 
particular importance is that DeVaro and Waldman find that for first promotions, even after 
controlling for performance, the probability of receiving a promotion increases with the worker’s 
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education level.  Since classic tournament theory predicts the opposite, this finding is 
particularly problematic for the classic tournament approach. 
 So in summary, much of the relevant evidence is consistent with both approaches, 
evidence consistent with convex wage structures favors the classic tournament approach, and 
recent evidence concerning how education affects promotion probabilities favors the market-
based tournament approach.  So possibly the correct answer is that neither theory completely 
captures how promotion prizes work in real-world labor markets, but each theory captures an 
important part of the full story.  This is what I discuss next. 
 In the classic tournament approach the firm is able to commit to the size or sizes of 
promotion prizes and rules concerning who to promote without any constraints.  But if 
promotions serve as signals as suggested by various theoretical papers and some recent empirical 
evidence, then those signals may constrain the firm in terms of the promotion prizes it commits 
to.  For example, suppose a firm wants to commit to a promotion prize of ten thousand dollars, 
but when a promotion actually takes place the signal associated with the promotion causes other 
firms to increase their wage offers for the worker by twenty thousand.  Will the firm stay with a 
promotion prize of ten thousand and let the worker be bid away by alternative employers?  If the 
rents the firm earns from employing the worker are high enough, the answer is no!  Rather, the 
firm will increase the promotion prize to reduce the probability the worker leaves.30  So I think a 
plausible hybrid model is that firms commit to promotion prizes and rules concerning who to 
promote constrained by the wage offers of other firms and, in particular, how the signaling role 
of promotions affects those wage offers.31 
                                                     
30 Barron, Berger, and Black (2006) report empirical evidence that counteroffers of this sort are common, although 
they do not specifically consider the possibility of counteroffers after promotions. 
31 One does not literally have to think that a firm commits to promotion prizes and rules concerning who to promote 
but rather a commitment-like outcome is achieved through repeated interaction and reputation formation, although 
Zabojnik (2010) shows that in a competitive setting the full commitment outcome cannot be achieved through 
repeated interaction no matter how large is the discount factor.  Also, note that this hybrid model has some similar 
features to the model of Harris and Holmstrom (1982) where in a symmetric-learning framework contracting is 
constrained by the wage offers of alternative employers.   
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 My conjecture is that such a hybrid model is capable of capturing all of the empirical 
findings I have discussed.  Based on the logic of Rosen’s (1986) analysis, for promotions at low 
levels of the job ladder the firm would like to commit to small wage increases upon promotion 
because the prize for such promotions is already large due to the probability of receiving 
subsequent promotions.  The result is that the wage increases required by the signaling role of 
promotions serve as binding constraints, so promotion practices at the low end of the job ladder 
are best understood using market-based tournament theory.  This explains the DeVaro and 
Waldman results concerning how education affects promotion probabilities for first promotions. 
 On the other hand, consider promotions towards the top of the job ladder.  For these 
promotions the probability of subsequent promotions is small so classic tournament theory 
predicts that wage increases directly associated with such a promotion must be large in order to 
preserve incentives.  In turn, if the optimal tournament design has large wage increases for 
promotions towards the top of the job ladder, then the wage increases required by signaling are 
likely to be non-binding which means that promotions at the top of the job ladder are best 
thought of as being determined by classic tournament theory.  This in turn is a potential 
explanation for convex wage structures since classic tournament theory predicts promotion wage 
increases at the top of the job ladder that are consistent with a convex wage structure.     
   
V. CONCLUSION 
 Lazear and Rosen’s (1981) seminal analysis of promotion tournaments was the first paper 
to theoretically investigate the important role that promotions serve in providing incentives 
inside firms.  The Lazear and Rosen approach is to model a tournament as an optimal design 
problem where commitment is possible and promotion prizes and rules concerning who to 
promote are chosen to maximize the profits of the firm.  But there is also an alternative approach 
which builds on the promotion-as-signal hypothesis first put forth in Waldman (1984a).  In this 
argument promotions serve as signals of worker ability and thus alternative employers are 
willing to bid more for a worker after the worker is promoted.  The result is that to stop workers 
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from being bid away there is a large wage increase or prize associated with being promoted and, 
just like in the Lazear and Rosen approach, this prize can serve as an incentive for effort and 
human-capital investment. 
 In this paper I first reviewed both theoretical approaches and then compared each 
approach to the relevant empirical literatures.  My first point is that what I call the market-based 
tournament approach is consistent with most of the predictions investigated in the empirical 
literature that tests the classic tournament approach.  As a result, there are only a few pieces of 
evidence one can point to in trying to choose between the theoretical approaches.  On the one 
hand, the evidence in support of convex wage structures which is predicted by Rosen’s (1986) 
multi-round tournament model points towards classic tournament theory since this evidence does 
not seem easily explained by the market-based tournament approach.  On the other hand, 
DeVaro and Waldman (2011) find evidence concerning how education affects the probability of 
promotion that is consistent with market-based tournaments but is inconsistent with the classic 
tournament approach. 
 I also suggested a possible resolution of this conflicting evidence which is a synthesis of 
the two approaches.  In this hybrid approach the firm can commit to promotion prizes and 
practices as in the classic tournament approach but there are constraints on this commitment 
ability due to the signaling role of promotions.  For example, if the unconstrained optimal design 
indicates that a worker promoted from level 1 to level 2 should receive a ten thousand dollar 
raise but the signal associated with the promotion means the worker only stays if the raise equals 
twenty thousand, then the firm is constrained to have the pay increase equal twenty thousand.  I 
argue that such a hybrid model is potentially consistent with all of the evidence put forth in 
support of the classic tournament approach as well as DeVaro and Waldman’s findings 
concerning how education affects the promotion process. 
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 Finally, I believe that an interesting avenue for future research in this area would be to 
investigate both theoretically and empirically this hybrid approach for modeling promotion 
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